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Frederick C. Beiser, The Romantic Imperative: The 
Concept of Early German Romanticism. Cambridge, MA 
and London: Harvard University Press, 2003. 243 pp. (+ xiii) ISBN 
06740011805. 
Reviewed by Marianne Tettlebaum 
Haverford College 
Die ganze Geschichte der modernen Poesie ist ein fortlaufender 
Kommentar zu dem kurzen Text der Philosophie: Alle Kunst 
soll Wissenschaft, und alle Wissenschaft soll Kunst werden;  
Poesie und Philosophie sollen vereinigt sein. (Friedrich 
Schlegel, KritischeFragmente, 1797)  
 
[The entire history of modern poetry is a running commentary 
on the short text of philosophy: all art should become science and all 
science should become art; poetry and philosophy should be made 
unified.] 
What would it mean to take seriously the task Friedrich Schlegel's fragment 
sets for the future of art and science? What would a unified poetry-
philosophy be? What kind of practice would it entail? What kind of texts 
would it produce?  
That we ought indeed to take this demand seriously is the argument of 
Frederick Beiser's The Romantic Imperative, a collection of ten essays about 
the late eighteenth-century intellectual movement known in German 
as Frühromantik and commonly associated with the early writings of 
Novalis, Friedrich Schelling, August Wilhelm and Friedrich Schlegel, and 
Friedrich Daniel Schleiermacher, among others. Beiser argues that the ideas 
of these thinkers amount to nothing less than a political, ethical, and 
philosophical program for changing the world. Because Schlegel's call for an 
art that would become science and a science that would become art -- what in 
another fragment he calls the "romantic imperative" -- encapsulates, for 
Beiser, the romantics' program for change, it is worth dwelling a little longer 
on the above fragment before returning to his book. 
If the first part of the fragment is any indication, in a unified poetry-
philosophy, poetry would no longer serve merely as "commentary" on 
philosophy; rather, poetry would presumably be part of the "text" of 
philosophy, and philosophy would be part of the "commentary" of poetry. If 
poetry, in other words, is that which comments on philosophy, and 
philosophy is the text upon which poetry reflects, then a unification of poetry 
and philosophy would also mean a unification of commentary and text as 
integral parts of each other. In fact, it would render the distinction between a 
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text and its interpretation or commentary antiquated, a relic of a divided 
intellectual age before art became science and science art. 
It is not modern poetry itself that comments on philosophy in Schlegel's 
fragment, but modern poetry's history. This poetic history, however, is not 
solely of the past, for it also constitutes the present as a "running 
commentary." Philosophy, in turn, is represented by a short text. This text of 
philosophy, however, is not about the present; rather, it makes a demand for 
the future. It is, we might say, an imperative. 
What must actually be unified here, then, is a philosophical imperative with 
its poetic-historical commentary. The paradox involved in such an endeavor 
ought to be apparent. What Schlegel's fragment demands is nothing less than 
the unification of the history of poetry with the future of philosophy. It calls 
for a poetry-philosophy in which the imperative for the future is inseparable 
from the poetic-historical commentary upon it. It calls, in other words, for a 
philosophy that must ultimately be realized in the history of poetry and a 
poetic history that aspires to the demand of philosophy. To write poetic-
historical commentary, then, would be to issue an imperative for the future, 
and to issue an imperative for the future would be to write poetic-historical 
commentary.  
Before we settle on just any form of writing for this circular task, we would 
do well to consider the form in which Schlegel issues his challenge: the 
fragment. The audacity of Schlegel's demand -- its prophetic claim about the 
entire history of modern poetry, the content of philosophy, and the future of 
art and science -- is, after all, counteracted by the modesty of the concise, 
unassuming form in which it is written. This fragment is simply one among 
many others; its extravagant claims are not matched by any privileged 
position or emphasis. Its effectiveness, we might say, derives precisely from 
its modesty. Indeed, we might even go so far as to suggest that its demand is 
modesty itself. We should understand the unification of poetry and 
philosophy, in other words, as a modest goal, something we achieve not on a 
grand scale but in the minutest level of detail. The precondition for the true 
unification of two intellectual endeavors, the fragment implies, is modesty -- 
the ability to think the grandeur of the whole microcosmically.  
In this respect, The Romantic Imperative is at once too modest and not 
modest enough. The book is Beiser's attempt to rectify what he perceives as 
the failure of recent scholarship to address the philosophy of early German 
Romanticism: "its epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, and politics" (ix). 
Recent scholars, Beiser argues, have not heeded Schlegel's call for the 
unification of poetry and philosophy; they have focused on literature at the 
expense of philosophy and so have created the impression that philosophy 
was unimportant, even contradictory to the aims of the Frühromantik. 
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Beiser's essays, originally written at various points over the last decade, are 
thus intended to expose the reader to the neglected philosophical aspects of 
early German romanticism. Although the essays do not present a continuous 
argument, they do proceed with increasing complexity and detail from an 
overview of the general background and aims of the Frühromantik (Chapters 
One-Six) to a more specific consideration of its attempts to resolve the 
philosophical problems it inherited from Leibniz, Spinoza, Fichte, and Kant 
(Chapters Eight-Ten). In the middle stands the only chapter (Chapter Seven) 
that focuses specifically on a particular representative of the Frühromantik, 
in this case, Friedrich Schlegel. 
Beiser labels the essays "introductory, an attempt to guide the anglophone 
reader through unfamiliar territory" (ix). But here he is overly modest; for his 
book is aimed as much at the expert as it is at the amateur. He wants not only 
to introduce the philosophy of early German romanticism to an unfamiliar 
audience but also to rethink its legacy in current scholarship, which, for him, 
means counteracting, if not invalidating, the understanding of German 
romanticism we have inherited from Paul de Man, Phillipe Lacoue-Labarthe, 
Jean-Luc Nancy, Manfred Frank, and Isaiah Berlin, among others. That 
Beiser lumps these scholars together under the rubric of "postmodern," a 
term he leaves undefined but that seems to stand for anything having to do 
with literary theory, is puzzling, to say the least. In attempting to recuperate a 
role for philosophy in what he characterizes as a predominantly literary 
understanding of Frühromantik, Beiser reinscribes the very division between 
philosophy and literature that the romantics, in his view, were trying to 
overcome. His attempt to reconstruct the philosophy of early German 
romanticism, in other words, is premised upon the bracketing of literary 
concerns from philosophical ones. When he characterizes the "literary 
approach" of de Man or Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy as "one-sided," he 
forecloses the possibility, envisioned by Schlegel above, that what is literary 
(or poetic) must also be philosophical. 
If Beiser's characterization of his essays as introductory is too modest, then 
his claim to "reconstruct the individuality of Frühromantik" via a broad 
philosophical-historical overview is not modest enough. I do not mean here 
that it suffers from a lack of humility. Rather, I mean that its overarching 
argument does not pay enough attention to the minute, even modest details 
of the texts from which it draws its support. For the sake of a coherent 
philosophical argument it sacrifices attention to the individual texts of 
individual German romantic authors. An attention to the general over the 
specific is, one might argue, necessary for an introductory account that 
attempts to convey unfamiliar ideas to its readers. But in the case of 
the Frühromantik such a necessity is more problematic. What seems to me 
crucial about the Frühromantik -- what I have attempted to convey in my 
opening analysis of Schlegel's fragment -- is that its struggle to convey ideas 
is bound up with its struggle to find the appropriate form in which to convey 
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them. Those who turn to Beiser's account for an introduction to early 
German romanticism will be exposed neither to its struggles with language 
and form nor to the wonderful playfulness that such struggles bring to its 
approach to philosophy. Nor will they be in a position to appreciate the 
monumentality of the task Beiser attempts by isolating a coherent 
philosophical argument from this vast array of texts. By contrast, those who 
are already familiar with Frühromantik and who turn to Beiser's account for 
a deeper understanding of its philosophical underpinning will likely be put 
off by its lack of attention to specific texts. There are very few direct 
citations from German romantic writings anywhere in these essays, and those 
that are provided are often cited as an afterthought to support a general point 
rather than as the basis for further close reading. 
In a sense, then, Beiser has written himself out of a potential audience, which 
is a shame, because he thereby undercuts the much-needed philosophical 
exploration of Frühromantik that he attempts. Although he overstates his 
case against the "literary approach," he rightly recognizes a need to focus on 
what J.M. Bernstein has called the "philosophical weightiness" of some of 
the works of the Frühromantik. According to Beiser, the young romantics' 
concern with politics and ethics is manifest not only in the importance they 
attributed to Bildung -- "the fundamental political problem facing the young 
romantics was therefore . . . to prepare the German people for the high ideals 
of a republic by giving them a moral, political, and aesthetic education" (49) 
-- but also, more provocatively perhaps, in their ideal of a regulative system 
of reason. Beiser acknowledges that the romantics found philosophical 
systems restrictive; nonetheless, he argues, they still "adamantly affirmed 
the esprit systematique because a complete system is a necessary, if 
unattainable, regulative ideal of reason" (34). His first six essays are devoted 
to these twin claims about the pragmatic and theoretical aspects of 
the Frühromantik. 
Beiser argues that in order to appreciate the young romantics' interest 
in Bildung and reason, we must reassess its relationship to the 
Enlightenment. Far from signaling the end of the German 
Enlightenment, Frühromantikrepresents, in Beiser's view, the reworking and 
continuation of its goals, especially with respect to the "right of the 
individual to think for himself" and the importance of Bildung. What 
the Frühromantik brought to bear upon the Enlightenment, according to 
Beiser, was a Platonic emphasis on "holisticexplanation" or, more 
specifically, a Platonic reading of Kant's view of the relationship between 
reason and truth. When viewed from this perspective, Beiser suggests, the 
young romantics' idea of aesthetic experience is not so much a kind of 
"suprarationalism" that claims an obscure awareness of the "mystery of 
being" as it is a form of Naturphilosophie, an attempt to provide a holistic 
explanation of nature through an understanding of reason's own reproductive 
capacity (65-6). We will never gain transparent access to the working of 
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reason -- reason can never absolutely know itself -- but its attempt to do so 
serves as a "regulative goal, which we can approach but never attain through 
infinite striving" (67). 
Beiser, in other words, reads the aestheticism of the Frühromantik as "itself a 
form of rationalism." He concludes, therefore, that "the distinction 
between Frühromantik and Aufklärung [enlightenment] is at best between 
two forms of rationalism; but it cannot be between aestheticism and 
rationalism per se" (60). But in elaborating this distinction he does not go far 
enough; his argument is weakened by the professed modesty of his aims. For 
instance, in Chapter Three, "Early Romanticism and the Aufklärung," he 
concludes that "the problem of determining the young romantics' relationship 
to the Aufklärung depends on precisely ascertaining their attitude toward 
reason. But it is just here that the texts of the young romantics prove to be 
very elusive, vague, and at best, ambivalent" (55). 
But it is precisely just here, at the point where the texts become ambivalent, 
that interpretation ought to begin. What Beiser needs, in other words, is a 
close reading and an in-depth account of how certain texts or certain thinkers 
deal with the issue of reason. This need for further textual attention does not 
mean that he ought to have adopted the literary approach he rejects; rather, it 
means he ought to have marshaled the insights that can be gained from a 
close reading to strengthen and support his philosophical conclusions.  
At stake is the very basis of Beiser's endeavor. Because for the most part he 
only references rather than cites the texts under discussion (often, individual 
thinkers within the movement are not differentiated), the Frühromantik, in 
his account, is always on the verge of losing the very individuality he is 
attempting to give it. At some points, especially when Beiser discusses its 
desire for a regulative system, Frühromantik seems nothing more than 
reworked Kantianism. At the other end of the spectrum, when he emphasizes 
the ideals toward which that system aspires, Frühromantik verges on 
Hegelianism, a point Beiser himself anticipates. This slippage raises again 
the issue of literary form that Beiser sidelines; for, is not the experimentation 
with, and even insistence on, a diversity of literary forms precisely what 
distinguishes Frühromantik philosophy from its predecessors and 
successors? 
When Beiser writes that the young romantics were "simply reformers, 
moderates in the classical tradition of Schiller, Herder . . . and a whole host 
of Aufklärer" and argues that "they gave such enormous importance to art 
mainly because they saw it as the chief instrument of Bildung, and hence as 
the key to social and political reform," he misses the crucial point (49). If 
the Frühromantik attention to art was as instrumental as Beiser believes, then 
there would be no reason to distinguish it at all. He misses the opportunity, 
especially in the chapter on Schlegel, to synthesize the "philosophical 
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weightiness" of his insights with the actual texts themselves -- to explain 
how these texts in their various forms constitute a philosophical practice 
distinct from the practices that preceded and followed it. Beiser's version 
of Frühromantik risks becoming crushed by the philosophical weight he 
wants it to bear. 
Beiser's eighth and ninth essays -- "The Paradox of Romantic Metaphysics" 
(on the romantic attempt to unite the systems of Fichte and Spinoza) and 
"Kant and the Naturphilosophen" -- are perhaps the most important and 
certainly the most thorough and rigorous of the entire collection. Even they, 
however, only further rather than stem the slippage in the Frühromantik's 
identity. In fact, it is telling that these essays are really more about Fichte, 
Spinoza, and Kant than they are about the early romantics. Frühromantik, in 
other words, serves here as a sophisticated commentary upon the Fichtean, 
Spinozan, and Kantian texts of philosophy, rather than as a philosophical text 
in its own right. Beiser himself admits as much in a footnote to his 
discussion of Kant's theory of teleological judgment: 
Here one caveat is necessary. The romantics did not explicitly, self-
consciously, and methodically reply point-for-point to Kant's arguments. It is 
therefore necessary for the historian to reconstruct their response, which 
means drawing out some of the implications of their general position. This 
requires considering what they would or could have said in response. My 
reconstruction is based on the texts cited in note 1 above and notes 17 and 19 
below. (220-21, n. 16) 
But only those with the requisite volumes from the complete works of 
Schelling, Schlegel, Novalis, and Hegel are likely to follow up. So that when 
Beiser asks us to take seriously the organic concept of nature that the 
romantics developed from their synthesis of Fichte and Spinoza and their 
study of Kant, we are unclear how much of the concept is from the early 
romantics and how much has been astutely put together by Beiser himself. 
Admittedly, he insists that his argument is not merely an historical 
reconstruction -- that it stems "more or less" from the early writings of 
Schelling and Hegel (167) -- but this does not explain how it relates, for 
instance, to Novalis and especially to Schlegel, to whom he devotes the 
previous chapter, and thus begs the question of whether Naturphilosophie is 
not, in fact, something other than Frühromantik and, if so, what exactly the 
relationship between the two might be. 
Here again, Beiser does not go far enough. His discussion 
of Naturphilosophie ends with a fascinating dilemma that he ought to have 
explored further. The romantics, he argues, believed that "the artist's and 
philosopher's awareness of nature is nothing less than the self-awareness of 
nature through the artist and the philosopher" (148). They assume an organic 
concept of nature, in which the relationship between mind and nature, 
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between reason and the surrounding world, is not causal but "teleological in 
the sense that each term realizes its nature only through the other" (148). 
Whereas Kant held that such a teleological view of nature could only be 
regulative -- that is, only an idea of reason rather than a property of nature 
itself -- the romantic Naturphilosophen, according to Beiser, insisted that it 
was constitutive: only if we assume from the outset that nature has its own 
purpose can we begin to understand our interaction with it as something 
distinct from ourselves. In Beiser's view, in other words, the romantics were 
willing to go one step further than Kant in assuming that we can in fact 
attribute purposes to nature itself. This assumption, however, as Beiser 
explains, places the Naturphilosophen in an awkward position vis-à-vis the 
concept of freedom. For, if there is such a thing as natural purposes, purposes 
prior to our own existence, then our freedom to act on our own as moral 
agents is in jeopardy. 
Having carefully set up this dilemma, however, Beiser lets it drop: "What the 
romantics have to say about freedom is another issue, which is far beyond 
the scope of this chapter to investigate . . . If I have shown that the organic 
concept is more than naïve speculation -- and if I have also shown that the 
Kantian critique is more than positivist dogmatism -- I will have achieved 
my purposes here" (170). Again Beiser is too modest in his aims. His book 
ought to have begun here, for the question of the early romantics' concept of 
freedom is merely the flip side of the question of their view of reason, the 
other significant issue Beiser ought to have addressed further. 
The question of the extent to which the young romantics developed their own 
coherent theories of reason and freedom is, ultimately, a question of the 
status of early German romanticism itself -- whether we 
view Frühromantikas the commentary upon an existing set of philosophical 
texts or as constituting a philosophical text in its own right. Beiser's intent 
may be the latter, but he argues most convincingly for the former. Pace his 
own aims, his essays do not accomplish the rescue of a pre-existing 
collection of texts and thinkers, under the heading Frühromantik, from a 
literary approach that has misinterpreted them. Rather, they 
recreate Frühromantik as something else entirely: as one intellectual-
historical movement that emerged, among others, in order to rethink the 
Enlightenment for the next generation. Frühromantik, as Beiser's essays 
present it, refers not so much to the particular texts of specific thinkers 
produced during a given period of time as it does to a particular current of 
intellectual response to the philosophical problems raised by the 
Enlightenment. 
Beiser's book offers us, therefore, an historical reconstruction 
ofFrühromantik as a running commentary on philosophy. In this respect, he 
would have done better to convert his separate essays into a continuous 
narrative. He provides a solid background for understanding the "romantic 
7
Tettlebaum: Tettlebaum on Beiser
0
  
BRYN MAWR REVIEW OF COMPARATIVE LITERATURE, Volume 5 , Number 2 (Winter 2006) 
 
imperative" Schlegel issues in the fragment I cited above. But he does not 
attempt to answer to that imperative. If we take that imperative and its 
philosophical implications seriously, as Beiser asks us to do, then we must 
also take seriously its call for a different kind of philosophical practice -- and 
for a different form of philosophical text. 
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